Missile strikes and drone attacks heighten South Asian crisis - 8 questions answered over the role of Pakistan’s military in responding

Pakistan’s government has pledged to respond “at a time, place and manner of its choosing” following an air attack from India that killed 31 people in Pakistan on May 6, 2025.

The missile strike comes at a time of increased tension between the two South Asian neighbors following a terror attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir on April 22 that resulted in the deaths of 26 Indian tourists.

India blamed the assault on its neighbor although has yet to provide any solid proof of a link between the assailants and the Pakistani state.

To understand more about how Pakistan’s powerful military is viewing the incident, and weighing a response, The Conversation U.S. turned to Ayesha Jalal, an expert on South Asian history and politics who is the Mary Ricardson Professor of History at Tufts University.

Who will makes the decisions over how Pakistan responds?

This is clearly a defense issue, so the Pakistani military is going to take the lead. Any decision over how to respond to the Indian airstrikes will have to be done in consultation with the civilian government. But ultimately it will be the powerful Pakistani generals that will be making the decisions.

In Pakistan, this is the usual way of doing things. The military has dominated politics in Pakistan for decades. Partly, this is due to the very dynamic we are seeing now. From the creation of Pakistan onward, there has been tension with India, including over Kashmir. Indeed the two countries went to war over Kashmir within a year of the partition of India soon after the creation of Pakistan. So the military has always been seen as central to Pakistan’s view of itself as an independent nation.

Then in 1958, the Pakistani army toppled the civilian government in the country’s first of several military coup attempts, three of which have been successful.

Since that time onward, no civilian government has been able to govern successfully for long without the support of the army. Recent political developments in the country – the ouster and arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and a 2024 election that resulted in a weak coalition government – have only strengthened the hand of Pakistan’s military.

What do we know about Pakistan’s army chief Gen. Syed Asim Munir?

Despite the Pakistani Army’s position of power, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff, is someone who has tried to keep out of the spotlight. He is known as a very religious character – he is a Hafiz, meaning he has memorized the Quran. And he is seen as a tough, fairly inaccessible soldier.

He is also a hawk when it comes to relations with India. Speaking after the Kashmir attack and before India’s airstrikes, Munir warned, “Let there be no ambiguity: Any military misadventure by India will be met with a swift, resolute, and notch-up response.”

This approach is somewhat of a departure from that of the man he replaced in 2022, former Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa. Bajwa was more inclined to look for a peaceful resolution with India over Kashmir and other issues.

Munir, by contrast, presents a a more belligerent front in the face of what many in Pakistan see as Indian aggression, while framing the rivalry between the two nations in religious terms.

What role has he and the Pakistani army played so far in the crisis?

A lot has been made, especially in India, of comments that Munir made a few days before the attack in Pahalgam.

Munir described Kashmir as Pakistan’s “jugular vein” and framed the long-running animosity between Pakistan and India in religious terms, invoking the “two-nation” theory that states that India is a homeland for Hindus; Pakistan is one for Muslims. The theory, conveyed by much of India’s media, is that Munir’s was an inflammatory statement that encouraged the Pahalgam attack.

But there is nothing in what he said that was entirely original or new: This has been the narrative of the Pakistani military for several decades. It is simply how they talk.

Is there evidence that Pakistan’s military played a role in the attack?

None that India has presented as yet.

India has blamed Pakistan for supporting the Kashmiri militants responsible – but hasn’t articulated what the actual relationship is between Pakistan and the militant group, The Resistance Front.

Certainly, Pakistan has in the past had ties to some of the many militant groups in Kashmir. For some groups, that has meant crossing over from Indian-controlled Kashmir to Pakistan for training.

But the argument that “Pakistan used to do it, so they must be doing it now” seems unsupported – certainly, Indian hasn’t presented solid evidence to any international body.

What has the reaction of the international community been?

India is not on as strong of ground as it was in 2019, when a suicide bomber in Pulwama, Indian-administerd Kashmir, killed 40 members of the Central Reserve Police Force. On that occasion, the international community swung behind India, with the U.S. offering counterterrorism support while calling on Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorists.

Without firm evidence of a link between the attack and Pakistan this time around, the international community has found it difficult to go with India’s narrative of the attack. The U.S. has called on both sides to find a “peaceful resolution.”

Meanwhile China has indicated that it is standing by Pakistan in a statement in which it expressed “regret over India’s military actions” while also calling on both India and Pakistan to “avoid taking actions that further complicate the situation.”

What pressures will the Pakistani army be under to respond?

In Pakistan, the view is this is India attempting to assert its dominance and create what analysts have called a “new normal” in relationships between the two countries – one in which India will retaliate to any perceived Pakistani-linked terror attack with missile strikes on Pakistan’s territory.

The theory here is that India doesn’t mind escalation, in fact it is seen as serving the Hindu nationalist aims of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

But I wouldn’t describe it as public pressure on Pakistan’s military to respond, it is more strategic pressure. Pakistan will need to prevent this “new normal” happening, and so will, in my view, very likely respond in kind to the Indian airstrikes.

What can Pakistan do in response?

Well, for starters it has, in theory, the capacity to hit over 200 Indian cities with its arsenal of missiles. But Pakistan Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif has already said that strikes would only target Indian military targets and not civilians. Pakistan also has to weigh how India may respond to any retaliatory strikes.

But India has expanded the usual terms of engagement when it comes to Kashmir. Typically in recent years, fighting has been contained along the “line of control” – the border between Indian- and Pakistani-controled Kashmir.

But the Indian airstrike was deep within Pakistan. India says that the targets were all terrorist, but civilians were killed in the process – and Pakistan’s military will not be able to just leave it at that. A response is very much expected, especially now that India has upped the ante by using Israeli made Harop drones in an attempt to target the Pakistani air defense system. Pakistan claims it has shot down 25 of these drones.

What are the risks of escalation for Pakistan?

Obviously the most pressing risk is that Pakistan and India are both nuclear states. If Pakistan retaliates in an escalatory way, and then India responds in a similar fashion, this gets to a point where the use of nuclear weapons is a very real risk.

War would also hit Pakistan’s economy at a time when it is seen to be improving after years of crisis. But that will likely be of secondary importance in the decision-making process for Pakistan’s military if it believes that the country’s integrity is being threatened.

In addition, Pakistan’s generals will likely be of the view that India, in attacking Pakistan, is trying to thwart any economic recovery in Pakistan – with the belief being that India’s government fears a powerful, more economically stable rival.

Ayesha Jalal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.